Implications of “Operation Spider’s Web” for UK Base Defence

Jun 03, 2025

late May 2025, Ukraine launched a daring multi-base drone assault deep inside Russia, code-named Operation Spider’s Web ndtv.com. Small, explosive-laden drones were covertly smuggled inside Russia and hidden in ordinary trucks, then remotely launched in swarms from just outside several strategic airbases ndtv.com. The operation deployed 117 drones simultaneously against five airfields across Russia – including bases in Murmansk, Siberia, and the Far East – and destroyed or damaged at least 41 aircraft, such as Tu-95MS and Tu-22M strategic bombers and even an A-50 AWACS radar plane ndtv.com ndtv.com. President Zelenskyy hailed it as a “brilliant” long-range strike that knocked out roughly “34% of [Russia’s] strategic cruise missile carriers” at those bases ndtv.com. This unprecedented raid – using truck-launched drone swarms operated by Ukrainian special forces behind enemy lines – shocked military observers and exposed serious vulnerabilities in traditional air base defences. Western defence planners, including in the UK, are now urgently assessing what lessons Operation Spider’s Web holds for base security and missile defence strategies going forward.

Below, we analyse how these novel tactics exploited gaps in conventional defences, evaluate the UK’s current base protection posture (domestically and abroad), and consider whether British systems like Sky Sabre/CAMM and radars are adequate against such threats. We then review expert recommendations – from UK MoD, NATO, and think tanks (RUSI, CSIS, etc.) – on countering asymmetric drone attacks. Finally, we discuss implications for UK and NATO force protection: how overseas bases (e.g. RAF Akrotiri), naval task groups, and training deployments must adapt their security protocols, and what broader changes in Western base defence and investment priorities are needed (e.g. hardened perimeters, counter-UAS technology, and updated rules of engagement).

Covert Truck-Launched Drones: Exposing Base Defence Vulnerabilities

Operation Spider’s Web relied on covert infiltration and deception to bypass Russia’s formidable air defences. According to Ukrainian intelligence sources, drones were concealed under roofs of wooden sheds mounted on trucks, which parked near the target bases; at the designated moment, the roof structures were remotely opened to release swarms of small FPV (first-person-view) kamikaze drones that only had to fly a short distance to hit parked aircraft ndtv.com washingtonpost.com. Russia’s Ministry of Defence confirmed the drones were launched “in the immediate vicinity of the airbases” rather than from Ukraine ndtv.com – meaning Ukraine effectively inserted the launchers inside Russian territory right under the enemy’s nose. This tactic exploited a blind spot in traditional base defence: most air defence systems are oriented outward to detect and intercept threats approaching from afar, not small slow-flying objects suddenly popping up from just outside the perimeter fence or overhead.

Traditional large SAM systems (like Russia’s S-400 or Pantsir batteries) struggled to respond. Many high-end radars have difficulty picking up low-signature, low-altitude drones amid ground clutter until it’s too late. In this case, Russia claims some attacks at certain bases were repelled ndtv.com, but at others the drones penetrated: “several units of aircraft caught fire” in Murmansk and Siberia ndtv.com ndtv.com. The swarming aspect (117 drones striking five bases simultaneously) likely overwhelmed local defences. No single point-defence gun or missile system could engage dozens of tiny targets coming all at once from different angles. Moreover, by launching from within Russian territory, Ukraine bypassed early-warning networks. Systems like long-range radars or combat air patrols that would normally detect inbound threats at a distance were ineffective – the drones only travelled a few kilometres from launch to target, offering almost no reaction time.

This highlights a general vulnerability of traditional base defence: bases are usually designed to fend off threats coming from outside (aircraft, missiles, etc.), while assuming the area inside friendly territory is secure. Infiltration by saboteurs or special forces – in this case using civilian trucks as Trojan horses – can nullify those layered defences by delivering attack drones right to the doorstep. It reveals that static defences (fences, guard patrols, and checkpoint security) alone may not detect a determined covert attack team, especially in large host nations. Russian security forces reportedly detained some individuals involved after the fact ndtv.com, but that was too late to stop the initial surprise.

In summary, the Spider’s Web tactics – covertly positioning launch platforms near targets and unleashing short-range drone swarms – demonstrated how an adversary can circumvent traditional base protection. Any base that lacks 360° close-range surveillance and rapid drone-neutralising defences is at risk of a similar “internal” attack. Hardened shelters and dispersal of aircraft become critical when even a small explosive drone can set a $100 million bomber ablaze. Western militaries must now scrutinise their own base defences for these gaps: Could an enemy replicate Ukraine’s feat against NATO bases? As one analyst warned, if Ukrainian operatives can do this to Russian bases, NATO commanders must ask “why it can’t happen to Toulon, Faslane, Groton, Pearl Harbor, etc.” linkedin.com. The harsh lesson is that asymmetric drone tactics can neutralise billions in defence systems by exploiting the seams between traditional security layers.

Is the UK’s Base Defence Posture Ready for Such Threats?

The UK’s current base defence posture – both at home stations and deployed bases abroad – was not originally designed with truck-launched drone swarms in mind. Historically, the British approach to air base defence has emphasised deterrence and perimeter security rather than dense integrated air defences on-site. Within the UK homeland, dedicated ground-based air defence (GBAD) units are limited. In fact, Britain has no permanent domestic SAM batteries defending its airfields day-to-day; the Army’s new Sky Sabre missile system (using CAMM missiles) is fielded for protecting deployed forces, not for static homeland airbase defence ukdefencejournal.org.uk. One defence commentator notes bluntly: “We have no UK dedicated GBAD beyond some C-UAS assets used by the RAF Regiment.” ukdefencejournal.org.uk This means that aside from Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) fighter jets on standby to intercept traditional air threats, UK bases at home rely on the RAF Regiment for on-the-ground protection, including any anti-drone measures. The RAF Regiment provides armed security patrols and has recently taken the lead in operating counter-Uncrewed Air System (C-UAS) equipment for base protection raf.mod.uk raf.mod.uk.

Notably, the RAF stood up specialised C-UAS units under 2 Force Protection Wing (e.g. No. 34 and 63 Squadrons) to deploy systems like ORCUS – a modular counter-drone system with multiple sensors and electronic effectors raf.mod.uk raf.mod.uk. The ORCUS C-UAS (developed by Leonardo for Project Synergia) can detect, track, identify and, if necessary, electronically defeat rogue drones, and is intended to “improve protection of key infrastructure including air bases around the UK and overseas.” raf.mod.uk. Introduced in 2020–22, ORCUS uses a passive RF detector (the Skyperion system) to spot drone control signals and can jam or disrupt drones’ electronics airforce-technology.com airforce-technology.com. A small number of these units exist as a national standby capability, deployable to respond to drone incidents (for example, they were used to stop drone incursions that shut down civilian airports) airforce-technology.com. This shows the UK recognises the drone threat and has begun fielding countermeasures. However, coverage is limited – one ORCUS can protect a specific site, but not all RAF stations at once.

For domestic bases, radar coverage and early warning against small drones remain patchy. Long-range primary radars (like those used in UK airspace surveillance) are tuned for aircraft or missiles, not tiny UAVs hugging the terrain. The British Army’s new Giraffe AMB 3D radar with Sky Sabre can elevate on a mast to spot “low-flying intruders” out to 120 km army.mod.uk, but such systems are few and not permanently guarding every installation. Indeed, Sky Sabre batteries are scarce – reportedly only around 6 units in service – with one deployed to the Falklands and another previously in Eastern Europe ukdefencejournal.org.uk ukdefencejournal.org.uk. The rest form a small contingent under 16 Regiment Royal Artillery to protect field forces. This means a critical home base (like RAF Marham or Brise Norton)would not routinely have a dedicated SAM unit on site unless a specific threat warranted emergency deployment. In peacetime, UK airbases rely on general security and perhaps ad hoc counter-drone response (jammers, rifles, or police helicopters) if a drone is sighted.

British bases overseas face similar challenges. For example, RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus is a key air hub for operations over the Middle East, and it lies within range of regional adversaries’ drones (e.g. Iran or proxy militias). While details are sparse, it’s likely Akrotiri has bolstered security – possibly deploying RAF Regiment C-UAS teams or coordinating with Cypriot forces – after incidents like drone strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq/Syria. (In one notable case, an RAF Typhoon deployed in Syria shot down a small hostile drone approaching the Al-Tanf coalition base in 2021 gov.uk gov.uk, underlining that UK forces abroad have already confronted weaponised drones). Other UK forward locations, such as the Falkland Islands garrison, have received a Sky Sabre battery to protect against aircraft or missiles, but might need additional systems to counter small UAVs that could be launched from covert boats or nearby islands. Naval task groups must also adapt – Britain’s aircraft carriers and escort ships have advanced radars and Phalanx CIWS guns for anti-missile defence, yet a swarm of low-flying drones or loitering munitions could pose a novel threat at sea. The Royal Navy has trailed new tech (like laser dazzlers and electronic jammers) on ships, but these are in early stages.

Crucially, UK outposts embedded with allies rely on collective defence. In Estonia or Poland (NATO’s eastern flank), UK troops fall under NATO integrated air defence, which since Russia’s war has been upgraded with more short-range systems (e.g. German Gephard guns, American Avengers, etc.) to counter drones. However, NATO commanders admit that across the alliance, “not a single NATO army is ready to resist the cascade of drones” witnessed in Ukraine reuters.com. The British Army in particular has “absent [C-UAS] capabilities in any structured sense”, making it an “urgent operational requirement” to fill this gap rusi.org rusi.org. In sum, the UK’s base defence posture in 2025 is in transition – awareness is high, and some counter-drone units exist, but coverage is limited, and many bases remain exposed. The Spider’s Web scenario exposes that a determined adversary with drone swarms could penetrate current defences, especially if they exploit internal launch points or the element of surprise.

Can Sky Sabre, CAMM, and Existing Radars Counter Drone Swarms?

The UK’s headline air defence systems – the new Sky Sabre / Land Ceptor missile batteries equipped with CAMM missiles – are highly capable against conventional aerial targets, but their adequacy against low-signature drones is questionable. Sky Sabre is a state-of-the-art short-to-medium range SAM system: its CAMM missiles reach speeds over Mach 3 (≈2300 mph) and are advertised to “eliminate fighter aircraft, drones, and laser-guided smart bombs.” army.mod.uk In testing, a Sky Sabre battery can control up to 24 missiles in flight to intercept multiple targets simultaneously army.mod.uk. It uses the Saab Giraffe AMB 3D radar on a mast, which rotates to scan 360° and can detect aircraft or larger drones out to 120 km, including at low altitude army.mod.uk. On paper, therefore, Sky Sabre could shoot down hostile drones – indeed the system was rushed into service to replace Rapier and provide modern protection, and one battery has been deployed to Poland (and later Estonia) specifically to guard against potential Russian drones or aircraft. However, several limitations emerge when considering small UAS swarms:

Coverage & Deployment: The British Army only fields a handful of Sky Sabre batteries (on the order of half a dozen) ukdefencejournal.org.uk ukdefencejournal.org.uk. These are intended to protect forward-deployed forces or high-value sites during conflict, not to sit permanently at every RAF base. If a drone swarm attack came with little warning, there is no guarantee a Sky Sabre unit would be in place at the threatened location (except perhaps the Falklands). In an emergency, units could be redeployed, but that requires detection of the threat beforehand – the very problem with an inside launch scenario.
Radar Detection: While Giraffe AMB is a capable radar that can detect low-flying targets, its effectiveness against very small, slow drones (like quadcopters or FPV drones with tiny radar cross-sections) is limited by physics and clutter. Drones hugging the terrain or flying below tree-top level might not be seen until very close. Gaps in coverage (such as directly overhead or very close to the radar) could be exploited if drones launch from just outside the base perimeter. Traditional radar-based defence also struggles with objects that have unpredictable, erratic flight paths (a swarm of mini-drones might appear more like a flock of birds on radar). Ukraine’s experience shows that purely radar-based detection must be augmented with visual, acoustic, or RF sensors for a robust drone early warning csis.org csis.org.
Engagement Capacity & Cost: Firing a CAMM missile (costing hundreds of thousands of pounds) at a $5,000 homebuilt drone is a losing proposition both economically and practically. A Ukrainian commander pointed out the “elementary mathematics” of this asymmetry: cheap drones can saturate defences and impose exorbitant cost son the defender reuters.com. Even though Sky Sabre can guide multiple missiles, its magazine is limited; a launcher holds 8 missiles, and a battery might have only a few launchers. A concerted swarm of dozens of drones could exhaust missile supply quickly – the defenders would be spending £100k+ missiles to shoot down hobby drones en masse, if they could even lock onto them. NATO officials have noted this cost exchange is unsustainable, since many countries keep limited interceptor stocks reuters.com reuters.com. In essence, using high-end SAMs alone against swarms is inefficient.
Minimum Range/Reaction Time: Missiles like CAMM have a minimum engagement range and need a brief window to react. A drone launched a few hundred meters away might leave too little time for the system to detect, fire, and intercept before the drone hits its target. Point-defence systems with nearly instantaneous effect (like guns or high-power microwaves) are better suited once the threat is that close.

In light of these factors, Sky Sabre/CAMM is excellent for traditional air threats (fighter jets, cruise missiles, large UAVs) and could handle some drone threats (e.g. a larger armed UAV or a slow-moving Shahed-136 loitering munition). But for defending a base against Spider’s Web-style tactics, it is not a panacea. The UK’s defence community recognises that layered counter-drone defences are needed. This means supplementing SAMs with other sensors and weapons: electronic warfare, short-range anti-aircraft guns, man-portable missiles, and directed-energy weapons. The British Army has reintroduced some anti-aircraft guns via allied systems (for example, the Army has evaluated the German Gepard 35mm gun in exercises rusi.org rusi.org, and also uses the portable Starstreak HVM missiles in some units). The Royal Navy is trailing new laser weapons and in 2023 fitted Drone Dome jammers on some vessels for counter-UAS. The RAF Regiment’s ORCUS system can “defeat hostile drones” via jamming or hacking rather than expensive missiles raf.mod.uk.

Encouragingly, the UK is investing in novel anti-drone technologies. In April 2025, the MoD announced a successful trial of a Radio-Frequency Directed Energy Weapon that can “knock out drone swarms” using focused radio waves gov.uk gov.uk. This prototype neutralised multiple drones simultaneously at a range up to 1 km, effectively frying their electronics for a mere £0.10 per shot gov.uk. Such RF or laser-based weapons, once operational, would provide a cost-effective complement to missile defences, exactly addressing the cost and saturation problems. The UK is pouring R&D funds into these (over £40 million so far on RF weapons, with a goal to field ≥10% of MoD procurement on novel tech by 2025-26) gov.uk gov.uk.

In summary, current UK systems like Sky Sabre/CAMM are valuable but insufficient alone against low-signature, short-range drone threats launched from near the base. They must be integrated into a broader counter-UAS architecture. A layered defence would use radars and passive sensors to detect small drones early, electronic warfare or directed energy to disable many of them cheaply, and reserve missiles or guns for anything that gets through. The adequacy of UK defences will depend on how quickly these layers are put in place across bases. At the moment, gaps remain – but the UK is moving to fill them with new technologies and by adapting its doctrines, as we discuss next.

Recommendations and Evolving NATO Doctrine

Western military experts and organisations have been studying the drone warfare lessons from Ukraine and sounding the alarm that base defence doctrine must evolve. Key recommendations focus on establishing layered, integrated defences against drones and on changing the “mindset” of base security to treat drones as a ubiquitous threat. Some of the insights and steps being adopted include:

Adopt Layered Counter-UAS (C-UAS) Approaches: NATO is finalising its first-ever comprehensive counter-drone doctrine to guide member states in defending against unmanned aircraft c4isrnet.com. A top NATO adviser explains that this doctrine will emphasise multilayered defences and integrated response – meaning using a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic measures and coordinating across domains (air, land, electronic) c4isrnet.com. The goal is to ensure common training and procedures so that all NATO bases and forces can systematically counter drones. This was driven by recognition that alliance forces were not well prepared; as noted, Ukrainian officials have warned “not a single NATO army” was initially ready for the mass drone tactics seen in Ukraine reuters.com. NATO’s doctrine (expected by end of 2023) builds on a 600-page handbook of best practices c4isrnet.com, now condensed into formal guidance urging nations to invest in C-UAS at scale and employ layered, cost-effective solutions.
Integrate Base Air Defences into Wider IAMD: The UK think-tank RUSI argues that protecting key bases from drones should not be a standalone effort, but part of an Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) framework linking national and alliance assets rusi.org. For example, a critical airbase’s point-defence (like anti-drone jammers or short-range SAMs) should be cued by and connected with higher-level radars and fighters. This ensures the “air picture” is shared and any drone threat is engaged at multiple layers (far away if possible, and close-in if it slips through) rusi.org. NATO’s air defence bosses have noted that the war in Ukraine greatly expanded the threat spectrum – from “low-cost one-way drones” up to hypersonic missiles – and this “necessitates a fundamental reconsideration” of air defence doctrine csis.org csis.org. Allied air forces are therefore going “back to first principles,” improving basic sensor coverage and response tactics for small slow threats as well as big ones csis.org. One example is Ukraine’s use of networks of inexpensive acoustic sensors and observers to detect drones that radars miss csis.org; NATO countries are studying similar methods to fill gaps in and around bases.
Emphasise Soft-Kill and Cost Balance: Experts unanimously recommend expanding “soft-kill” options (jamming, spoofing, high-power microwaves) to avoid the cost trap of using $100k SAMs on $1k drones. NATO officers have explicitly highlighted the economic advantage drones have and that Western forces must “recognise” and counter this with cheaper defences reuters.com. This is driving interest in directed-energy weapons (lasers, RF) as well as low-cost interceptors (such as drone-on-drone defence or shotgun-shell-like munitions). A layered defence might use electronic warfare as the first line (to cut control links or GPS), then guns or C-UAS intercept drones to physically destroy the rogue drones, and only use missiles as a last resort for higher-end or distant targets rusi.org rusi.org. The British trials of an RF weapon (described above) and ongoing development of a laser weapon (the Dragonfire project) align with these recommendations, as they promise pennies-per-shot engagement costs and instant effect.
Improve Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Authorities: Dealing with drones, especially in peacetime or gray-sone situations, raises tricky ROE issues. NATO guidance is being updated to clarify when troops can engage unidentified drones near bases. A recent real-world example came in late 2024 in the UK: mysterious small drones were spotted hovering around several RAF bases in England (Lakenheath, Mildenhall, etc.) over multiple days defencescoop.com. This prompted joint US-UK monitoring and some counter-drone measures, though officials were cautious not to immediately shoot them down since their origin and intent were unclear defencescoop.com defencescoop.com. The Pentagon’s spokesman noted the need to protect bases without assuming every drone is hostile, to avoid unintended harm especially in civilian areas defencescoop.com. Going forward, experts suggest establishing clear “no-fly sones” around sensitive sites and pre-approved ROE so base commanders can quickly disable or down a drone that violates that airspace defencescoop.com defencescoop.com. The UK has already passed legislation giving police and MoD police powers to intercept drones in restricted sones (after the 2018 Gatwick airport drone incident), and similar rules are likely being adopted on military sites – including perhaps permission to use electronic jamming or even lethal force on a drone if it threatens critical assets.
Harden and Disperse Physical Assets: As a defensive measure, NATO militaries are also revisiting old ideas of hardening bases. One lesson from Spider’s Web is that aircraft parked in the open make easy targets. Western air forces, which often have flightlines full of multi-million-pound jets, may need to invest in more hardened shelters, blast pens, and decoys. Dispersal plans (moving aircraft between different bases or scatter sites) also complicate an attacker’s planning. These are passive defences but important: they ensure that even if some drones get through, the damage is limited. U.S. and NATO doctrines post-Ukraine emphasise building resilience – the ability for bases to take a hit and keep operating. This includes stockpiling repair equipment, fire suppression systems, and spare parts so that a few drone strikes won’t knock out operations for long.
Intelligence and Counter-Sabotage: Finally, experts highlight the need for better intelligence-sharing and counter-sabotage efforts to prevent the next “Spider’s Web” before it starts. In NATO’s new thinking, base defence isn’t just about technology at the fence line – it’s also about finding and neutralising enemy teams or cells that might be planning to infiltrate near our bases. This might mean closer cooperation with domestic security agencies to monitor suspicious activities around military sites, or even offensive cyber and special forces actions to pre-empt drone launch teams. As Air Marshal Johnny Stringer (UK) observed, sometimes “being necessarily offensive to be defensive” is required against mass drone threat scsis.org. In practice, that could mean if NATO were in conflict and saw the enemy staging a swarm attack, they might strike the launch trucks or operators first.

In essence, Western doctrine is rapidly adapting to the drone era. NATO’s largest ever air defence exercise (Air Defender 2023) included drone scenarios, and alliance members are procuring various C-UAS systems. The UK’s Ministry of Defence statements reflect this priority: “the nature of warfare is changing” with drone swarms, and the UK is significantly increasing spending on novel defences to meet this threat gov.uk. Think tanks like RUSI and CSIS reinforce that investment in counter-drone tech and training of operators must accelerate across all services c4isrnet.com c4isrnet.com. There is also recognition that defending against drones is not purely a military challenge – it involves airspace regulators, law enforcement, and new legal frameworks. All these recommendations feed into how the UK will protect its global deployments.

Implications for UK Overseas Bases and Deployments

Global deployments of UK forces – from permanent bases like RAF Akrotiri and British Army training teams abroad, to naval task groups and ad-hoc missions – will all need to elevate their base security protocols in light of the Spider’s Web paradigm. The risk is no longer confined to high-end state-on-state war; even non-state actors or proxy groups could use similar tactics on a smaller scale. Here’s how various UK deployments might adapt:

RAF Akrotiri (Cyprus) – This large air base hosts RAF Typhoon and Voyager detachments and supports operations in the Middle East. It is within drone range of hostile groups in Syria or potentially Iran-backed militants. The base likely already has robust perimeter security due to the terrorism threat but now must consider in-theatre drone attacks. The UK can deploy an RAF Regiment C-UAS detachment (e.g. with ORCUS or Drone Dome) to Akrotiri for persistent coverage. Joint drills with Cypriot forces to counter drones would improve readiness. Additionally, establishing a buffer sone around the base (monitoring commercial trucks or boats in the vicinity) could help prevent a truck-launched surprise. Given that Russian forces in Syria (at Latakia’s Khmeimim base) faced multiple DIY drone swarms from insurgents en.wikipedia.org themoscowtimes.com, the RAF can study how the Russians responded – they added Pantsir short-range AD systems and radar-directed AA guns around their base. Similar multi-layer point defences (perhaps a Sky Sabre battery or a few Skykiller 30mm guns) could be positioned at Akrotiri if threat level rises.
Royal Navy Task Groups – The Carrier Strike Group centred on HMS Queen Elisabeth (or Prince of Wales) operates globally, including in areas where drones are proliferating. Naval vessels have to prepare for small drones launched from unknown craft (e.g. a hostile fishing vessel or merchant ship). Western navies have already seen explosive drone boats and UAVs used in places like the Red Sea and Gulf – for instance, Iran’s proxies have used Shahed drones and remote bomb boats against shipping. The RN will need to expand its shipboard counter-UAS capabilities: this might include equipping escorts with portable drone jammers, introducing 360° IR/optical tracking systems to spot small drones, and integrating the new Dragonfire laser once operational to sap incoming UAVs. The task group’s air wing (F-35 jets and helicopters) might also get new ROE to intercept drones at a distance, as the RAF did over Syria. Closer coordination with allies (US Navy, etc.) on drone threat intelligence will also be vital. In a carrier group, each ship can contribute – destroyers like Type 45 have powerful radars that can cue others when a drone is detected, and each ship’s CIWS gun can take an assigned sector for hard-kill if needed. The Navy is even considering swarm vs swarm tactics – using friendly drones to intercept hostile ones. All these measures will make British naval units less vulnerable to a surprise “drone swarm ambush.”
Deployed Army and RAF units (e.g. Estonia, Poland, Iraq, Kenya) – UK troops deployed in NATO’s eastern battlegroups or on training missions face both the possibility of adversary drones and local hostile use. In Eastern Europe, Russian intelligence or Belarusian units might try to overfly NATO camps with small drones (for spying or harassment). Already in Ukraine’s neighbourhood there have been suspicious drone incidents (e.g. unexplained drones over Polish military areas). UK units abroad will thus beef up active drone monitoring: using hand-held drone detectors, maintaining watch with sentries specifically scanning for UAVs, and setting up jammer perimeter systems around encampments. The British Army recently procured devices like the Drone Defender and SkyWall nets for troops to use against quadcopters. At the larger scale, Britain will coordinate with host nations to ensure airspace deconfliction – for example, in Kenya or Oman during exercises, they’ll establish restricted fly zones, so any intruder stands out.

Moreover, force protection training is evolving. Troops are being trained to respond to drone threats much as they would to incoming mortar fire: with alarms, taking cover, and using electronic countermeasures. The RAF Regiment’s new 2 FP Wing is effectively a deployable counter-drone task force – it can fly out to a location and set up a defensive bubble. We can expect that any significant UK base abroad (whether a permanent garrison or a temporary camp) will, as a standard, request a C-UAS package as part of its protection. This might become as routine as having an RAF Police detachment or a Field Hospital unit. If, for instance, the UK establishes a training base in a partner nation, it may include provisions to install drone detection sensors around the perimeter and train local guards in spotting drone threats.

Protecting Training Missions in Conflict Sones – In non-NATO states where British trainers or peacekeepers operate (for example, the recent deployment in Mali or currently in places like Somalia or Nigeria for training programs), the drone threat often comes from insurgents. Terrorist groups have used off-the-shelf drones for surveillance and even as bomb carriers (ISIS notably did in Syria/Iraq). The UK will ensure its small teams have portable C-UAS gear – e.g. a rifle-like jammer that a soldier can use to down a quadcopter. Intelligence sharing with allies is key here: if insurgents are known to possess drones, British teams must adapt their base layout (e.g. put netting over sleeping quarters, have a quick reaction force ready). It’s a new facet of force protection that even small units cannot ignore.

Overall, the protocols for base security are expanding to address drones. This includes mundane but important steps: updating guard force checklists to include “look for drone launch activity in vicinity”; conducting regular drone attack drills (e.g. what to do if a swarm is incoming – jam, shoot, take cover, recover evidence after); and working with local authorities to manage airspace. In coalition bases, like those hosting both US and UK forces, there’s an effort to unify these procedures, so everyone responds coherently. The incident in November 2024 with drones over RAF Lakenheath saw US and UK personnel jointly monitoring and taking measures, which indicates such cooperation is already happening defencescoop.com defencescoop.com.

Broader Implications for Western & NATO Base Defence Strategy

The emergence of tactics like Operation Spider’s Web is forcing a paradigm shift in Western base defence thinking. No longer can large military bases rely on the assumption of a secure rear area or purely focus on high-tech threats. The priorities for investment and doctrine are visibly shifting toward countering asymmetric, low-cost threats. Key broader implications include:

Hardening and Redundancy as Priorities: Western militaries are likely to invest more in hardening base infrastructure. This means funding more hardened aircraft shelters, fortified command centres, and redundant systems. The goal is to ensure that even if some drones get through, the damage is contained (e.g. one aircraft lost instead of a whole flight line ablaze). The Russian experience of losing a large number of aircraft on the ground (not only in this drone’s case, but also earlier in Crimea when Saki Airbase was struck) has underscored how costly the lack of dispersal/hardening can be. NATO air forces, including the RAF, are re-evaluating how they park and protect assets at airbases. We may see Western airbases looking more wartime-ready even in peacetime, with QRA jets kept in shelters or bunkered fuel storage, etc. Hardened perimeters – not just fences, but things like counter-IED barriers and surveillance cameras covering approaches – will also receive funding. For instance, stopping a truck infiltration might be as simple as better controlling road access around bases (perhaps extending the secure sone outward with checkpoints on approach roads).
Mass Deployment of Counter-UAS Tech: Expect a significant scaling-up of counter-drone technologies across NATO. Where today a handful of units exist (e.g. the UK’s ORCUS or the US’s Negation of Improvised Non-State Joint Aerial system, NINJA, etc.), in a few years every major base or brigade could have a counter-UAS battery. NATO’s senior leadership aims to have forces “ready to deter Russia by 2028”, and fielding C-UAS is acknowledged as “an urgent requirement” toward that rusi.org. This will likely drive more procurement of systems like the Israeli Drone Dome, the German Skynex gun system, portable vehicle-mounted jammers, and radar/EO sensor fusion networks for base defence. Notably, NATO has set up a common fund for allies to acquire “counter-small UAS equipment” through a joint framework breakingdefence.com, which makes it easier for smaller countries (and the UK) to quickly field off-the-shelf solutions. We are also seeing joint exercises to practice counter-drone tactics – NATO ran trials in 2023 simulating drone swarms and jamming to validate its new playbook atlanticcouncil.org. All this indicates that counter-UAS is becoming as standard in base defence as, say, guard towers and searchlights once were.
New Rules of Engagement & Legal Authorities: Western nations will refine their rules of engagement regarding drones, both in war and peace. Domestically, laws might be updated to declare a no-fly sone around military bases with clear authority for the MoD to engage any intruding drone (already UK has measures for airports; these will extend to defence sites). Internationally, NATO might develop collective rules for how to respond if unidentified drones are operating near allied bases (to avoid confusion or accidentally downing each other’s UAVs). In active conflict, high-level policy may explicitly permit strikes on enemy drone launch systems even if they are located in what was previously considered “safe” territory. For example, Western planners likely take note that Ukraine struck Russian soil with its own assets (due to Western weapons restrictions) washingtonpost.com washingtonpost.com; similarly, NATO might decide that if an enemy is using a neighbouring neutral territory to launch drones, those launchers become legitimate targets. We may also see predelegation of authority to base commanders to act quickly against drones – important when engagements happen in seconds or minutes. Overall, ROE will catch up to ensure quick, decisive action can be taken against drones without lengthy clearance.
Cultural Change in Force Protection: The concept of base security is broadening from guarding against saboteurs on foot or lone terrorists, to defending against a technological threat from above. This is causing a cultural shift: base defence units (like the RAF Regiment, USAF Security Forces, etc.) are training in what was once the purview of anti-aircraft units. They are effectively becoming air defenders on the ground, merging traditional infantry-style guarding with high-tech sensor operation and electronic warfare. NATO’s approach encourages this multi-skill development – for instance, a base defence troop might need to know how to operate a drone jammer one moment and respond to a physical perimeter breach the next. We can anticipate increased funding for training specialists in counter-drone operations at the small-unit level, so that every platoon or company has someone proficient in spotting and defeating UAS rusi.org rusi.org. RUSI’s recommendation is that “all platoons must have the ability to detect UAS and have electronic countermeasures” on hand rusi.org. This is a profound change from even a decade ago.
Investment and R&D Priorities: Western defence spending is tilting toward these priorities. Instead of only big-ticket platforms, there’s now substantial investment in autonomous systems and their counters. The UK’s Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper have already flagged the importance of drones and drone defence. We see concrete budget lines for things like the RAF’s SYNERGIA program (developing ORCUS and related tech) and the Army’s directed energy weapon prototypes gov.uk. NATO as a whole is coordinating R&D so that solutions can be shared – for example, a European Defence Fund project on counter-drone is bringing together multiple nations to co-develop technology. This trend will likely accelerate because countries see the stark evidence from Ukraine that those who don’t adapt will suffer losses. In effect, drone defence is now a top-tier requirement, not a niche concern.

Finally, perhaps the most far-reaching implication is a change in strategic mindset: Western militaries (like their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts) are realising that air superiority can no longer be taken for granted even at home bases. The playing field has somewhat levelled – a small country or non-state group can threaten even a superpower’s air assets on the ground using inexpensive drones. This compels a rethinking of how to project power safely. For the UK and NATO, it means greater caution and protection for high-value assets (bombers, AWACS, tankers, etc.), more deception and operational security (so adversaries can’t easily find where your assets are concentrated), and an offensive outlook that if conflict looms, eliminating the enemy’s drone capabilities early will be crucial.

In conclusion, Operation Spider’s Web served as a wake-up call. It vividly demonstrated that innovative, low-cost tactics can penetrate legacy defences and impose outsized damage. For the UK, this means its missile and base defence strategies must evolve – blending advanced systems like Sky Sabre with new counter-drone layers, ensuring global deployments are protected, and prioritising agility in defence planning. NATO and British defence policy documents post-2022 echo these needs, calling for rapid adaptation to the “new era of threat” from drones and autonomous systems theguardian.com. Going forward, we will see a much stronger emphasis on hardened, well-defended perimeters; ubiquitous counter-UAS coverage; and nimble rules of engagement that together aim to prevent a Spider’s Web-style attack on any Western base. The overall investment in base defence resilience – doctrinally and technologically – is becoming a foundation of deterrence in the 21st century. As one RAF commander put it, “the RAF requires an agile, technology-driven Force Protection force and with C-UAS at the forefront of its priority list, we will be at the cutting edge of this capability.” raf.mod.uk raf.mod.uk

Sources: Ukrainian and international media reports on Operation Spider’s Web ndtv.com ndtv.com ndtv.com; official UK MoD and NATO statements on air defence and counter-drone initiatives gov.uk gov.uk c4isrnet.com c4isrnet.com; analysis from RUSI and CSIS on lessons from Ukraine for NATO base defence csis.org csis.org rusi.org; Reuters interviews and UK Defence Journal commentary on NATO readiness and UK capabilities reuters.com ukdefencejournal.org.uk; RAF and Army publications on Sky Sabre, RAF Regiment C-UAS, and directed-energy trials army.mod.uk raf.mod.uk gov.uk; and reporting on recent drone incidents near Western bases and UK/US responses defencescoop.com defencescoop.com.